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Abstract. The Logic of Proofs, LP, and its successor, Justification
Logic, is a refinement of the modal logic approach to epistemology in
which proofs/justifications are taken into account. In 2000 Kuznets showed
that satisfiability for LP is in the second level of the polynomial hierar-
chy, a result which has been successfully repeated for all other one-agent
justification logics whose complexity is known.
We introduce a family of multi-agent justification logics with interactions
between the agents’ justifications, by extending and generalizing the two-
agent versions of the Logic of Proofs introduced by Yavorskaya in 2008.
Known concepts and tools from the single-agent justification setting are
adjusted for this multiple agent case. We present tableau rules and some
preliminary complexity results. In several cases the satisfiability problem
for these logics remains in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy,
while for others it is PSPACE or EXP-hard. Furthermore, this problem
becomes PSPACE-hard even for certain two-agent logics, while there are
EXP-hard logics of three agents.
1 Introduction
Justification Logic is a family of logics of justified beliefs. Where epistemic
modal logic treats formulas of the form Kφ with the intended meaning
that an agent knows/believes φ, in Justification Logic we consider for-
mulas of the form t:φ with the intended meaning that t is a justification
for φ - or that the agent has justification t for φ. The first Justifica-
tion Logic was LP, the logic of proofs, and appeared in [4] by Artemov,
but it has since developed in a wide system of explicit epistemic logics
with notable complexity properties that significantly differ from the cor-
responding modal logics: while every single-agent justification logic whose
complexity has been studied has its derivability problem in Πp2 (the second
level of the polynomial hierarchy), the corresponding modal logics have
PSPACE-complete derivability problems. Furthermore certain significant
fragments of these justification logics have an even lower complexity- NP,
or even P in some cases. For an overview of Justification Logic see [5]. For
an overview of complexity results of (single-agent) Justification Logic, see
[10].
In epistemic situations we often have multiple agents, so as it is the
case with modal logic, there is a need for a multi-agent justification logic.
In [15], Yavorskaya presents two-agent variations of LP. These logics fea-
ture interactions between the two agents’ justifications: for LP↑, for in-
stance, every justification for agent 1 can be converted to a justification
for agent 2 for the same fact and we have the axiom t:1φ→↑t:2φ,
1 while
LP! comes with the extra axiom t:1φ→! t:2t:1, so agent 2 is aware of agent
1’s justifications.
In [3], we extended Yavorskaya’s logics to two-agent variations of other
justification logics, as well as to combinations of two different justification
logics. We then gave tableau procedures to prove that most of these logics
were in the second step of the polynomial hierarchy, an expected result
which mimics the ones for single-agent justification logics from [9, 10, 1].
For some cases, however, we were able to prove PSPACE-completeness,
which was a new phenomenon for Justification Logic.
In this paper we continue our work from [3]. We provide a general fam-
ily of multi-agent logics. Each member of this family we call (JnD,F,V,C)CS ,
where n,D,F, V,C are parameters of the logic. For (JnD,F,V,C)CS we con-
sider n agents and the interactions between the agents’ justifications are
described by binary relations on agents, V and C. Furthermore, not all
agents are equally reliable: D and F are sets of agents, all agents in D
have consistent beliefs and all agents in F have true beliefs. These con-
cepts are made precise in section 2. It is our goal to provide a flexible
system capable of modelling situations of many diverse agents, or diverse
types of justifications, allowing for reasonably general interactions among
their justifications.
For this family of logics we provide semantics and a general tableau
procedure and then we make observations on the complexity of the deriva-
tion problem for its members. In particular, we demonstrate that all logics
in this family have their satisfiability problem in NEXP - under reason-
able assumptions. This family demonstrates significant variety, as it also
includes PSPACE- and EXP-complete members, while of course some of
its members have their satisfiability problem in Σp2. This is a somewhat
surprising result, as all single-agent justification logics whose complexity
is known have their satisfiability problem in Σp2.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we give the base
definitions of the syntax, axioms and semantics for each logic in the family.
1 We take some liberty with the notation to keep it in line with this paper.
Then we reintroduce the star calculus, an invaluable tool, and our first
complexity results, mirroring the ones for single-agent justification logic
(see [8]). The version of the star calculus we provide is somewhat different
than the usual ones in that it is based on a given frame. If the frame
includes a single world, we get the usual, more familiar version. In section
3 we give general tableau rules for each of our logics. Naturally, the rules
are parameterized by the logic’s parameters, including the interactions
between the agents, so special attention is given in that section to these
interactions. We then go on and further optimize the tableau procedure
with respect to the number of world-prefixes it produces; this results in
a Σp2 upper bound for the satisfiability of a general class of logics.
2 Multiagent Justification Logic with Interactions
In this section we present the system we study in this paper, its seman-
tics and the basic tools we will need later on. Most of the proofs for the
claims here can be adjusted from the one- or two- agent versions of Justifi-
cation Logic. The reader can see [5] or [10] for an overview of single-agent
justification logic and [3] for a two-agent version of this system.
2.1 Syntax
In this paper, if n ∈ N, [n] will be the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For every n ∈
N, the justification terms of the language Ln will include all constants
c1, c2, c3, . . . and variables x1, x2, x3, . . . and if t1 and t2 are terms, then
the following are also terms: [t1+ t2], [t1 · t2], ! t1. The set of terms will be
referred to as Tm. We also use a set SLet of propositional variables, or
sentence letters. These will usually be p1, p2, . . .. Formulas of the language
Ln include all propositional variables and if φ,ψ are formulas, i ∈ [n] and
t is a term, then the following are also formulas of Ln: ⊥, φ → ψ, t:iφ.
The remaining propositional connectives, whenever needed, are treated
as constructed from → and ⊥ in the usual way. The operators ·,+ and !
are explained by the following axioms. Intuitively, · applies a justification
for a statement A → B to a justification for A and gives a justification
for B. Using + we can combine two justifications and have a justification
for anything that can be justified by any of the two initial terms - much
like the concatenation of two proofs. Finally, ! is a unary operator called
the proof checker. Given a justification t for φ, ! t justifies the fact that t
is a justification for φ.
Let n ∈ N, D,F ⊆ [n] and V,C ⊆ [n]2. The logic (JnD,F,V,C)∅ is the
logic with modus ponens as a derivation rule and the following axioms:
Propositional Axioms: Finitely many schemes of classical propositional
logic;
Application: s:i(φ→ ψ)→ (t:iφ→ [s · t]:iψ);
Concatenation: s:iφ→ [s+ t]:iφ, s:iφ→ [t+ s]:iφ;
F -factivity: For every i ∈ F , t:iφ→ φ;
D-consistency: For every i ∈ D, t:i⊥ → ⊥;
V -verification: For every (i, j) ∈ V , t:iφ→! t:jt:iφ;
C-conversion: For every (i, j) ∈ C, t:iφ→ t:jφ,
where in the above, φ and ψ are formulas in Ln, s, t are terms and i, j ∈
[n]. F -factivity and D-consistency are the usual factivity and consistency
axioms for every agent in F and D respectively. Positive introspection is
seen as a special case of V -verification - in this context, if agent i has
positive introspection, then (i, i) ∈ V .
A constant specification for JnD,F,V,C is any set
CS ⊆ {c:iA | c is a constant, A an axiom of J
n
D,F,V,C and i ∈ [n]}.
We say that axiom A is justified by a constant c for agent i, when c:iA ∈
CS. A constant specification is: axiomatically appropriate with respect to
I ⊆ [n] if for every i ∈ I, each axiom is justified by at least one constant,
schematic if every constant justifies only a certain number of schemes
from the ones above (as a result, if c justifies A for i and B results from
A and substitution, then c justifies B for i) and schematically injective if it
is schematic and every constant justifies at most one scheme. Let cln(CS)
be the smallest set such that CS ⊆ cln(CS) and for every t:iφ ∈ cln(CS),
it is the case that for every j ∈ [n], ! t:jt:iφ ∈ cln(CS). (J
n
D,F,V,C)CS is
(JnD,F,V,C)∅ +R4
n
CS , where R4
n
CS just outputs all elements of cln(CS).
(JnD,F,V,C)CS is consistent: just map each formula to the propositional
formula that is the result of removing all terms from the original one; then,
all axioms are mapped to propositional tautologies and modus ponens
preserves this mapping.
2.2 Semantics
We now introduce models for our logic. In the single-agent cases, M-
models (introduced in [13, 9]) and F-models (introduced in [7, 14, 12]) are
used (also in [3] for two-agent logics) and they are both important in
the study of complexity issues. In this paper we are mostly interested
in F-models, which we will usually just call models. These are essentially
Kripke models with an additional machinery to accommodate justification
terms.
Let J = (JnD,F,V,C)CS . Then, an F-model M for J is a quadruple
(W, (Ri)i∈[n], (Ai)i∈[n],V), where W 6= ∅ is a set, for every i ∈ [n], Ri ⊆
W 2 is a binary relation on W , V : SLet −→ 2W and for every i ∈ [n],
Ai : (Tm× Ln) −→ 2
W . W is called the universe of M and its elements
are the worlds or states of the model. V assigns a subset of W to each
propositional variable, p, and Ai assigns a subset of W to each pair of a
justification term and a formula. Furthermore, (Ai)i∈[n] will often be seen
and referred to as A : [n]×Tm×Ln −→ 2
W and A is called an admissible
evidence function. Additionally, A must satisfy the following conditions:
Application closure: for any i ∈ [n], formulas φ,ψ, and justification terms
t, s,
Ai(s, φ→ ψ) ∩ Ai(t, φ) ⊆ Ai(s · t, ψ).
Sum closure: for any i ∈ [n], formula φ, and justification terms t, s,
Ai(t, φ) ∪ Ai(s, φ) ⊆ Ai(t+ s, φ).
CS-closure: for any formula t:iφ ∈ cln(CS), Ai(t, φ) =W .
V -Verification Closure: If (i, j) ∈ V , then Ai(t, φ) ⊆ Aj(! t, t:iφ)
C-Conversion Closure: If (i, j) ∈ C, then Ai(t, φ) ⊆ Aj(t, φ)
V -Distribution: for any formula φ, justification term t, (i, j) ∈ V and
a, b ∈W , if aRjb and a ∈ Ai(t, φ), then b ∈ Ai(t, φ).
The accessibility relations, Ri, must satisfy the following conditions:
– If i ∈ F , then Ri must be reflexive.
– If i ∈ D, then Ri must be serial (∀a ∈W ∃b ∈W aRib).
– If (i, j) ∈ V , then for any a, b, c ∈W , if aRjbRic, we also have aRic.
2
– For any (i, j) ∈ C, Rj ⊆ Ri.
Truth in the model is defined in the following way, given a state a:
– M,a 6|= ⊥ and if p is a propositional variable, then M, a |= p iff
a ∈ V(p).
– If φ,ψ are formulas, then M, a |= φ → ψ if and only if M,a |= ψ, or
M, a 6|= φ.
– If φ is a formula and t a term, then M, a |= t:iφ if and only if a ∈
Ai(t, φ) and M, b |= φ for all b ∈W such that aRib.
A formula φ ∈ Ln is called satisfiable if there are some M, a |= φ; we
then say that M satisfies φ in a. If CS is axiomatically appropriate with
respect to D, then (JnD,F,V,C)CS is sound and complete with respect to its
models; it is also sound and complete with respect to its models that have
2 Thus, if i has positive introspection (i.e. (i, i) ∈ V ), then Ri is transitive.
the Strong Evidence Property: M, a |= t:iφ iff a ∈ AI(t, φ); furthermore,
if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfied by a model M of at most 2|φ| states
- and in fact, it is satisfied by a model M of at most 2|φ| states that has
the strong evidence property (see [3] for proofs of all the above that can
be easily adjusted for this general case). A pair (W, (Ri)i∈[n]) as above is
called a frame for (JnD,F,V,C)CS .
2.3 The ∗-calculus.
We present the ∗-calculi for (JnD,F,V,C)CS . The ∗-calculi for the single-agent
justification logics have proven to be an invaluable tool in the study of
the complexity of these logics. This concept and results were adapted to
the two-agent setting in [3] and here we extend them to the general multi-
agent setting. Although the calculi have significant similarities to the ones
of the single-agent justification logics, there are differences, notably that
each calculus depends upon a frame and operates upon ∗-expressions
(defined below) prefixed by states of the frame. A ∗-calculus was first
introduced in [8], but its origins can be found in [13].
If t is a term, φ is a formula, and i ∈ [n], then ∗i(t, φ) is a star-
expression (∗-expression). Given a frame F = (W, (Ri)i∈[n]) and V,C ⊆
[n]2 and constant specification CS, the ∗FCS(V,C) calculus on the frame F
is a calculus on ∗-expressions prefixed by worlds from W with the axioms
and rules that are shown in figure 1.
Notice that the calculus rules correspond to the closure conditions
of the admissible evidence functions. In fact and because of this, given
a frame F = (W,R1, R2) and a set S of ∗-expressions prefixed by states
of the frame, the function A such that Ai(t, φ) = {w ∈ W |S ⊢∗F
CS
(V,C)
w ∗i (t, φ)} is an admissible evidence function and in fact it is the min-
imal admissible evidence function such that for every w ∗i (t, φ) ∈ S,
w ∈ Ai(t, φ) in the sense that always Ai(t, φ) ⊆ A
′
i(t, φ) for any other
admissible evidence function A′ such that for every w ∗i (t, φ) ∈ S,
w ∈ A′i(t, φ). Therefore, given a frame F = (W,R1, R2) and two set T ,F
of ∗-expressions prefixed by states of the frame there is an admissible ev-
idence function A on F such that for every w ∗i (t, φ) ∈ T , w ∈ Ai(t, φ)
and for every w ∗i (t, φ) ∈ F , w /∈ Ai(t, φ), if and only if there is no f ∈ F
such that T ⊢∗ f . This observation yields the following.
Proposition 1. For any3 constant specification CS, frame F with uni-
verse W and w ∈W , (JnD,F,V,C)CS ⊢ t:iφ ⇐⇒ ⊢∗FCS(V,C)
w ∗i (t, φ).
3 Note that we actually need an axiomatically appropriate constant specification to
have completeness with respect to F-models, so we cannot immediately conclude
∗CS(F) Axioms: w ∗i (t, φ), where t:iφ ∈
cln(CS) and w ∈ W
∗App(F):
w ∗i (s, φ→ ψ) w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗i (s · t, ψ)
∗Sum(F):
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗i (s+ t, φ)
w ∗i (s, φ)
w ∗i (s+ t, φ)
∗V(F): For any (i, j) ∈ V ,
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗j (! t, t:iφ)
∗C(F): For any (i, j) ∈ C,
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗j (t, φ)
∗V-Dis(F): For any (i, j) ∈ V and
(a, b) ∈ Rj ,
a ∗i (t, φ)
b ∗i (t, φ)
Fig. 1. The ∗FCS(V,C)-calculus: where F = (W, (Ri)i∈[n]) and for every i ∈ [n]
Proposition 2. Let CS be a schematic constant specification in P and
V,C ⊆ [n]2. Then, the following problem is in NP: Given a finite frame
F = (W, (Ri)i∈[n]) and a finite set S of ∗-expressions prefixed by worlds
from W , a formula φ, a term t, a w ∈W and i ∈ [n], is it the case that
S ⊢∗F
CS
(V,C) w ∗i (t, φ)?
The proof of this proposition is very similar to the one that can be found
in [10]. What is different here is the additional assignment of a state set
to each node of the derivation tree, which does not change things a lot.
Proof. For this proof and every j ∈ [n], let fj : 2
W −→ 2W , s.t. for every
X ⊆W , fj(X) = {y ∈W |∃x ∈ X, (j, j
′) ∈ V xRj′y} ∪X.
– Nondeterministically construct a rooted tree with pairs of the form
(j, s), where j ∈ [n] and s is a subterm of t, as nodes, such that
(i, t) is the root and the following conditions are met. Node (j, s)
can be the parent of (j1, s1) or of both (j1, s1) and (j2, s2) as long
as there is a rule
w ∗j1 (s1,φ1)
w ∗j(s,φ3)
or
w ∗j1 (s1,φ1) w ∗j2 (s2,φ2)
w ∗j(s,φ3)
, respectively,
of the ∗-calculus and as long as (j1, s1) 6= (j, s) 6= (j2, s2). To keep
with this result for any constant specification. Nevertheless, proposition 1 holds, but
to prove it we need to introduce M-models, but we do not use M-models anywhere
else. Thus, the reader can see [8, 10], or [3] for a proof of proposition 1 for all constant
specifications.
this structure a tree, we can ensure at this step that there are no
cycles, which would correspond to consecutive applications of ∗C(F)
and which would be redundant.
– Nondeterministically assign to each leaf, (j, l), either
• some formula ψ and the closure under fj of some set W
′ ⊆W , s.t.
for every w ∈W ′, w ∗j (l, ψ) ∈ S or,
• as long as l is of the form ! · · · !︸︷︷︸
k
c, where c a constant, k ∈ N, then
we can also assign some ! · · · !︸︷︷︸
k−1
c:ik · · · ! c:i2c:i1A and W
′ =W , where
A an axiom scheme, s.t. c:i1A ∈ CS.
– If for some node ν = (j, s) all its children, say ν1 = (j1, s1), ν2 =
(j2, s2) have been assigned some scheme or formula P1, P2 and world
sets V1, V2, assign to ν some scheme or formula P , such that P1, P2
can be unified to P ′1, P
′
2 such that
w∗j1 (s1,P
′
1) w∗j2 (s2,P
′
2)
w∗j(s,P )
is a rule in the
∗FCS(V,C)-calculus and world set V , where V is the closure of V1 ∩ V2
under fj. Apply this step until the root of the tree has been assigned
some scheme or formula and a W ′ subset of W .
– Unify φ with the formula assigned to (i, t) and verify that w ∈W ′
If some step is impossible, the algorithm rejects. Otherwise, it accepts.
Using efficient representations of schemes using DAGs and Robinson’s
unification algorithm, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. We can
see that as the tree is constructed, if (i, s) is assigned scheme P and set
V , then the construction effectively describes a valid derivation of any
expression of the form v ∗i (s, ψ), where v ∈ V and ψ an instance of P .
Therefore, if the algorithm accepts, there exists a valid ∗FCS(V,C)-calculus
derivation of w ∗i (t, φ). On the other hand if there is some ∗
F
CS(V,C)-
calculus derivation for w ∗i(t, φ) from S, then the algorithm in the first two
steps can essentially describe this derivation by producing the derivation
tree and the formulas/schemes by which the derivation starts. Therefore,
the algorithm accepts if and only if there is a ∗FCS(V,C)-calculus derivation
for w ∗i (t, φ) from S. See [8] and [10] for a more detailed analysis. ⊓⊔
The number of nondeterministic choices made by the algorithm in the
proof of proposition 2 is bounded by |t|+|S′|, where S′ = {∗j(s, ψ)|∃w ∗j
(s, ψ) ∈ S}. Therefore, if there is some formula ψ such that t:iφ is a sub-
formula of ψ and for every ∗j(s, ψ
′) ∈ S′, s:jψ
′ is a subformula of ψ, then
2|ψ|≥ |t|+|S′| and therefore we can simulate all nondeterministic choices
in time 2O(|ψ|). Thus the algorithm can be turned into a deterministic
one running in time 2O(|φ|) · O(|W |2). This observation, the fact that a
satisfiable φ can be satisfied by a model of at most 2|φ| states (see the
previous subsection) and the previous two propositions give the following
results:
Corollary 1. Let J = (JnD,F,V,C)CS , where CS ∈ P is schematic. Then,
1. Deciding for t:iφ that J ⊢ t:iφ is in NP.
2. If CS is axiomatically appropriate with respect to D, then the satisfi-
ability problem for J is in NEXP.
Additionally notice that if the term t has no +, CS is schematically injec-
tive and S = ∅, we have essentially eliminated nondeterministic choices
from the procedure above. Thus, we conclude (for the original result, see
[6]):
Corollary 2. Let J = (JnD,F,V,C)CS , where CS ∈ P is schematically in-
jective. Then, deciding for t:iφ, where t has no ‘+’, that J ⊢ t:iφ is in
P.
3 Tableaux
In this section we give a general tableau procedure for every logic which
varies according to each logic’s parameters. We can then use the tableau
for a particular logic and make observations on its complexity, as we do
in the following section. A version of the tableau which is more efficient
for some cases follows after. To develop the tableau procedure we need to
examine the relations on the agents more carefully than we have so far.
For this section and the following one fix some J = (JnD,F,V,C)CS and we
assume CS is axiomatically appropriate with respect to D and schematic.
3.1 A Closer Look on the Agents and their Interactions
If A1, . . . , Ak are binary relations on the same set, then A1 · · ·Ak is the
binary relation on the same set, such that xA1 · · ·Aky if and only if there
are x1, . . . , xk in the set, such that x = x1A1x2A2 · · ·Ak−1xkAky. If A is
a binary relation, then A∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of A; if A is
a set (but not a set of pairs), then A∗ is the set of strings from A. We
also use the following relation on strings: a ⊑ b iff there is some string c
such that ac = b. We define the following subsets of and relations on [n].
S = S(J) = {i ∈ [n]|(∃j ∈ D ∪ F ) iC∗j} attempts to capture exactly
those agents that require a serial accessibility relation; from now and
on these agents monopolize our attention;
R = R(J) = {i ∈ [n]|(∃j ∈ F ) iC∗j} attempts to capture exactly those
agents that require a reflexive accessibility relation;
CF = C ∪ {(i, j) ∈ V |i ∈ R, j ∈ S} notice that if iCF j, and xRjy, then
xRiy;
4
Q = (V |S∪C|S)
∗: if iQj, then i’s justifications somehow affect j’s justifi-
cations; conversely, j’s accesibility relations somehow affect i’s acces-
sibility relations;
≡C= C
∗
F ∩ (C
∗
F )
−1: i ≡C j if and only if iC
∗
F j and jC
∗
F i; we can easily
see that ≡C is an equivalence relation and that if i ≡C j, then i and
j have the same accessibility relations; similarly,
For the above equivalence relations we can define equivalence classes
on S, PC = {L1, . . . , LkC}. χ(i) is the equivalence class L ∈ PC s.t. i ∈ L.
We can define relations <C and <V C on PC in the following way:
P1 ≤C P2 iff ∃x ∈ P1∃y ∈ P2 s.t. xC
∗
F y and P1 ≤V C P2 iff ∃x ∈ P1∃y ∈ P2
s.t. xQy. Also, P1 <C P2 iff P1 ≤C P2 and P1 6≤C P2 and similarly for
P1 <V C P2. Then, define P1 ≤V P2 iff there are x ∈ P1 and y ∈ P2 s.t.
xQV Qy, that is, there are x1, x2 ∈ S, where xQx1V x2Qy. P1 <V P2 iff
P1 ≤V P2 and P2 6≤V P1.
Let i ∈ [n]. Then, MC(i) = MC(χ(i)) = {L ∈ PC |χ(i) ≤C L and
6∃ L′ ∈ PC s.t. L <C L
′}.
3.2 The Tableau Procedure.
The formulas used in the tableau will have the form ∅.σ s βψ, where
ψ ∈ Ln or is a ∗-expression, σ ∈ P
∗
C (the world prefixes are strings
of equivalence classes of agents), β is (either the empty string or) of
the form ✷i✷j · · ·✷k, i, j, . . . , k ∈ [n], and s ∈ {T, F}. Furthermore, ∅.σ
will be called a world-prefix or state-prefix, s a truth-prefix and world
prefixes will be denoted as ∅.s1.s2 . . . sk, instead of ∅.s1s2 · · · sk, where for
all x ∈ [k], sx ∈ PC .
A tableau branch is a set of formulas of the form σ s βψ, as above. A
branch is complete if it is closed under the tableau rules (they follow). It
is propositionally closed if σ T βψ and σ F βψ are both in the branch.
We say that a tableau branch is constructed by the tableau rules from φ,
if it is a closure of {∅ T φ} under the rules.
For every i, j ∈ S, i ∈ N(j) if there are some i′, i′′ ∈ S rR such that
i′ ≡V C i
′′, i′′V C∗F j and χ(i) ∈MC(i
′).
4 The F in CF is to indicate that CF is a variation of C influenced by the agents in
F , not that it is available with other subscripts
The tableau rules will include certain classical rules to cover proposi-
tional cases of formulas, as well as the ones that follow:
σ T t:iψ
σ T ∗i (t, ψ)
σ T ✷iψ
TrB
if i ∈ S;
σ T t:iψ
σ.χ(j) F ⊥
TrD if i ∈ S, χ(j) ∈MC(χ(i)), and j /∈ R;
σ T t:iψ
σ T ∗i (t, ψ)
Tr if i 6∈ S;
σ F t:iψ
σ F ∗i (t, ψ)
Fa
σ.χ(j) F ⊥
σ.χ(j).χ(i) F ⊥
S if i ∈ N(j);
σ T ✷iψ
σ.χ(i) T ψ
SB if σ.χ(i) has already appeared;
σ T ✷iψ
σ T ψ
FB if i ∈ F ;
σ T ✷iψ
σ T ✷jψ
C if iCj;
σ T ✷iψ
σ T ✷j✷iψ
V if iV j.
We do not explicitly mention it anywhere else, but of course, we need
a set of rules to cover propositional cases as well. In particular we can use
σ T ψ → ψ′
σ F ψ | σ T ψ′
and
σ F ψ → ψ′
σ T ψ
σ F ψ′
The separator | indicates a nondeterministic choice between the two
options it separates.
If b is a tableau branch, then5 W (b) = {σ ∈ ∅.P ∗C | there is some σ a ∈
b}. Let (Ri)i∈[n] be such that for every i ∈ [n],
Ri = {(σ, σ.χ(i)) ∈ (W (b))
2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ (W (b))2|i ∈ F}
5 ∅.P ∗C here and wherever else it may appear is the set {∅.x|x ∈ P
∗
C}.
then F(b) = (W (b), (R′i)i∈[n]), where (R
′
i)i∈[n] is the closure of (Ri)i∈[n]
under the conditions of frames for the accessibility relations, except for
seriality. (R′i)i∈[n] is constructed in the following way: for every i ∈ [n],
let R0i = Ri and for every k ∈ N ∪ {0},
Rk+1i = R
k
i ∪
⋃
(i,j)∈C
Rkj ∪
⋃
(i,j)∈V
{(a, b) ∈ (W (b))2|∃(a, c) ∈ Rkj , (c, b) ∈ R
k
i }
and then, F(b) = (W (b), (
⋃
k∈NR
k
i )i∈[n]).
Finally, let T (b) = {σ ∗i (t, ψ)|σ T ∗i (t, ψ) appears in b} and F (b) =
{σ ∗i (t, ψ)|σ F ∗i (t, ψ) appears in b}.
A branch b of the tableau is rejecting when it is propositionally closed
or there is some f ∈ F (b) such that T (b) ⊢
∗
F(b)
CS
(V,C)
f . Otherwise it is an
accepting branch.
By induction on the construction of F(b), it is not hard to see that
for every (σ, τ.χ(j)) ∈ Ri, it must be the case that iC
∗
F j or that i ∈ R
and σ = τ.χ(j). By induction on the frame construction we can see that
if σ T ✷iφ appears in b and σRiτ , then τ T φ appears in b.
Proposition 3. If there is a complete accepting tableau branch b ∋ ∅ T φ,
then the formula φ is satisfiable by a model for J .
Proof. Let M = (W, (Ri)i∈[n],A,V), where (W, (Ri)i∈[n]) = F(b), V(p) =
{w ∈W |w T p ∈ b}, and Ai(t, ψ) = {w ∈W |T (b) ⊢∗F
CS
(V,C) w ∗i (t, ψ)}.
Let M′ = (W, (R′i)i∈[n], (Ai)i∈[n],V), where for every i ∈ [n], if i ∈ S,
then R′i = Ri∪{(a, a) ∈W
2|∃j ∈ S s.t. iC∗F j, 6∃ (a, b) ∈ Rj} and R
′
i = Ri,
otherwise.M′ is an F-model for J : (Ai)i∈[n] easily satisfy the appropriate
conditions, as the extra pairs of the accessibility relations do not affect the
∗-calculus derivation, and we can prove the same for (R′i)i∈[n]. If aR
′
ibR
′
jc
and jV i, if (a, b) ∈ R′irRi, then a = b and thus aR
′
ic. If (a, b) ∈ Ri, then,
from rule S, there must be some (b, c′) ∈ Rj, so (b, c) ∈ Rj and thus,
(a, c) ∈ Rj. If (a, b) ∈ R
′
i and jCi, then, trivially, whether (a, b) ∈ Ri or
not, (a, b) ∈ R′j .
By induction on χ, we prove that for every formula χ and a ∈ W ,
if a T χ ∈ b, then M′, a |= χ and if a F χ ∈ b, then M′, a 6|= χ.
Propositional cases are easy. If χ = t:iψ and a F χ ∈ b, then a /∈ Ai(t, ψ),
so M′, a 6|= χ. On the other hand, if a T t:iψ ∈ b, then a ∈ Ai(t, ψ) and
by rule TrD, for every j ∈ S such that iC∗F j, there is some (a, b) ∈ Rj .
Therefore, for every (a, b) ∈ R′j , it is the case that (a, b) ∈ Rj , so by rule
TrB, a previous observation about formulas of the form w T ✷iα, and
the inductive hypothesis, for every (a, b) ∈ Ri, M
′, b |= ψ and therefore,
M′, a |= t:iψ. ⊓⊔
Now we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let φ ∈ Ln. φ is (J
n
D,F,V,C)CS-satisfiable if and only if
there is a complete tableau branch b that is produced from ∅ T φ, such
that
– for all σ, α, not both σ T α and σ F α appear in b and
– For any β ∈ F (b), T (b) 6⊢∗F
CS
(V,C) β.
Proof. The “if” direction was handled by proposition 3. We will prove the
“only if” in the following. LetM be an F-model, (W, (Ri)i∈[n], (Ai)i∈[n],V)
that has the strong evidence property and a state s ∈W such thatM, s |=
φ. Furthermore, fix some ·M : ∅.P ∗C −→ W , such that ∅
M = s and the
following conditions are met. For any σ.χ(i) ∈ P ∗C , (∅.σ.χ(i))
M is some
element of W s.t. ((∅.σ)M, (∅.σ.χ(i))M) ∈ Ri.
Let L✷n = {✷i1 · · ·✷ikφ|φ ∈ Ln, k ∈ N, i1, . . . , ik ∈ [n]}. Given a state
a of the model, and ✷iψ ∈ sub✷(φ), M, a |= ✷iψ has the usual, modal
interpretation, M, a |= ✷iψ iff for every (a, b) ∈ Ri, M, b |= ψ
We can see in a straightforward way and by induction on the tableau
derivation that there is a branch, such that if σ T ψ appears in the
branch and ψ ∈ L✷n , then M, σ
M |= ψ, if σ F ψ appears in the branch
and ψ ∈ L✷n , then M, σ
M 6|= ψ, if σ T ∗i (t, ψ) appears in the branch,
then σM ∈ Ai(t, ψ) and if σ F ∗i (t, ψ) appears in the branch, then
σM 6∈ Ai(t, ψ). The proposition follows. ⊓⊔
3.3 An Improved Tableau
By taking a closer look at the interactions between the agents we can
further improve the efficiency of our tableau procedure and we do that
in this section. We use this improvement to prove an upper bound on
the complexity of a general class of logics. We need the following defini-
tions and lemma 1, which is a generalization of a result from [1] and has
appeared in simpler forms in [3].
First we define an additional equivalence relation: ≡V C= Q ∩ Q
−1.
As an equivalence relation, this one too gives equivalence classes on S
and they are PV C = {P1, . . . , PkV C}. Notice that as C
∗ ⊆ (V ∪ C)∗,
≡C⊆≡V C and therefore PC is a refinement of PV C . We’ll call P = PV C .
Furthermore, notice that for any L ∈ P , either ∃x, y ∈ L s.t. xV y, or
L ∈ PC . In the first case, L will be called a V-class of agents and in the
second case it will be called a C-class of agents. For each agent i ∈ [n],
P (i) will be the equivalence class L ∈ P s.t. i ∈ L and To help keep the
relationship between the sets of equivalence classes in mind, notice that
i ∈ χ(i) ⊆ P (i) ⊆ S ⊆ [n]. Furthermore, we can extend relations <C and
<V C on P in the same way they were defined on PC .
Lemma 1. LetM = (W, (Ri)i∈[n], (Ai)i∈[n],V) be a (J
n
D,F,V,C)CS F-model
of at most 2|φ| states, Pa ∈ P a V-class of agents, and u ∈W . Then, there
are states of W , (ai)i∈Pa , such that
1. For any i ∈ Pa, uRiai.
2. For any i, j ∈ Pa, v, b ∈W , if ai, bRjv, then bRjaj.
(ai)i∈Pa will be called a Pa-cluster for u.
Proof. For this proof we need to define the following. Let i ∈ [n], w, v ∈
W . An EV -path ending at i (and starting at i
′) from w to v is a finite
sequence v1, . . . , vk+1, such that for some j1, . . . , jk ∈ [n], E1, . . . , Ek−1 ∈
{C−1, V −1}, where for some j ∈ [k−1] Ej = V
−1 and jk = i (and j1 = i
′),
for every a ∈ [k − 1], jaEaja+1 and if Ea = C
−1, then va+1 = va+2, while
if Ea = V
−1, then va+1Rja+1va+2 and v1 = w, vk = v, v1R1v2. The EV -
path covers a set s ⊆ [n] if {j1, . . . , jk} = s. For this path and a ∈ [k],
va+1 is a ja-state. Notice that if there is an EV path ending at i from w
to v and some j ∈ s and z ∈W such that the path covers s and zRjw, it
must also be the case that w, zRiv.
Let p : [m] −→ Pa be such that m ∈ N, p[[m]] = Pa and for
every i + 1 ∈ [m], either p(i + 1)Cp(i) or p(i + 1)V p(i) and there is
some i + 1 ∈ [m] such that p(i + 1)V p(i). For any s ∈ W , x ∈ N let
b0(s), b1(s), b2(s), . . . , bm(s) be the following: b0(s) = s, for all k ∈ [m],
b1(s) will be such that there is an EV path ending at p(1) from s to b1(s)
and covering Pa and if k > 1, bk(s) is such that b0(s), b1(s), b2(s), . . . , bk(s)
is an EV path ending at p(k). Let (b
x
i )i∈[m],x∈N, (a
x
i )i∈[m],x∈N be defined
in the following way. For every i ∈ [m], b0i = bi(u) and for every x ∈ N,
axi = bi(b
x
m). Finally, for 0 < x ∈ N, (b
x
i )i∈[m] is defined in the fol-
lowing way. If there are some bx, v ∈ W , i, j ∈ Pa, such that bxRjv,
ax−1i Rjv and not bxRja
x−1
j , then for all i ∈ Pa, b
x
i = bi(v). Otherwise,
(bxi )i∈Pa = (a
x
i )i∈Pa . By induction on x, we can see that for every x, y ∈ N,
i ∈ Pa, if y ≥ x, then bxRib
y
i , a
y
i . Since the model has a finite number of
states, there is some x ∈ N such that for every y ≥ x, (byi )i∈Pa = (a
y
i )i∈Pa .
Therefore, we can pick appropriate (ai)i∈Pa among (a
k
i )i∈Pa that satisfy
conditions 1, 2. ⊓⊔
We recursively define relation → on S∗:
– if jCF i then i→ j;
– if jV i, then ij → j;
– If β → δ, then αβγ → αδγ.
→∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of→.→∗ tries to capture the closure
of the conditions on the accessibility relations of a frame. This is made
explicit by observing that if for some frame (W, (Ri)i∈[n]), aRi1Ri2 · · ·Rikb
and i1i2 · · · ik →
∗ j1j2 · · · jl, then aRj1Rj2 · · ·Rjlb. Furthermore, if, in ad-
dition, l = k, then for every r ∈ [k], jrC
∗
F ir. For every agent i ∈ S, we
introduce a new agent, i and we extend →∗, so that when P (i) a V-class,
then i→∗ χ for every χ ∈ S∗ such that χ→∗ i. For each L ∈ PC , we fix
some i ∈ PC and L = i. Furthermore, if xy ∈ P
∗
C∪S
∗, then xy = x y. This
extended definition of →∗ tries to capture the closure of the conditions
on the accessibility relations of a frame like the ones that will result from
a tableau procedure as defined in the following.
Let L ∈ P and σ be a finite string of elements from PC . Then, L is
visible from ∅.σ if and only if there is some χ(i) ⊆ L, some χ ∈ P ∗C and
some α ∈ S∗ such that σ = τ.χ(i).χ and χα→∗ i; τ.χ(i) is then called the
L-view from σ. Notice that there is a similarity between this definition
and the statement of lemma 1 - this will be made explicit later on.
Then we adjust the tableau by altering rules TrD and S and introduce
rule SVB:
σ T t:iψ
σ.χ(j) F ⊥
TrD
if i ∈ S, χ(j) ∈ MC(χ(i)), j /∈ R, and
P (j) is not a V -class visible from σ;
σ.χ(j) F ⊥
σ.χ(j).χ(i) F ⊥
S
if i ∈ N(j) and it is not the case that
P (i) is a V -class visible from σ.χ(j);
σ T ✷iψ
τ.χ(i) T ψ
SVB
if P (i) a V -class, visible from σ, τ.χ(j)
is the P (i)-view from σ and τ.χ(i) has
already appeared in the tableau.
Then we have to redefine the frame F(b). Let (Ri)i∈[n] be such that
for every i ∈ [n],
Ri = {(σ, σ.χ(i)) ∈ (W (b))
2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ (W (b))2|i ∈ F}
∪
{(σ, τ.χ(i)) ∈ (W (b))2|P (i) a V -class, τ.χ(j) the P (i)-view from σ}
and F(b) = (W (b), (R′i)i∈[n]), where (R
′
i)i∈[n] is the closure of (Ri)i∈[n] as
it was defined before.
Proposition 3 and its proof remain the same. To prove proposition 4
for this version of the rules, follow the same proof, but for every a ∈ W
and V-class L fix some L-cluster for a and if P (i) is a V -class, then for
(aj)j∈L, the fixed L-cluster for σ
M, (σ.χ(i))M = ai - and observe that if
P (i) a V -class, visible from σ and τ.χ(j) is the P (i)-view from σ, then
in model M there is some v such that σM, (τ.χ(j))MRiv, which by the
definition of clusters in turn means that σMRj(τ.χ(j))
M. The remaining
proof is the same.
Notice that if for every appearing world-prefix σ.χ(i), i is always in
the same V-class L, then all prefixes are of the form ∅.χ(j), where j ∈ L.
In that case we can simplify the box rules and in particular just ignore
rule V and end up with the following result.
Corollary 3. When there is some V-class L such that for every i ∈ SrR
there is some i′ ∈ L such that iC∗F i
′, then (JnD,F,V,C)CS-satisfiability is in
Σp2.
4 Complexity Jumps
In this section we look into some more specific cases of multi-agent jus-
tification logics and demonstrate certain jumps in the complexity of the
satisfiability problem for these logics. We first revisit the two-agent logics
from [3]. Like in the previous sections, we assume our constant specifi-
cations are schematic and axiomatically appropriate (and in P for upper
bounds).
Our definition here of (JnD,F,V,C)CS allows for more two-agent logics
than the ones that were studied in [3]. It is not hard, though, to extend
those results to all two-agent cases of (JnD,F,V,C)CS : when there are {i, j} =
[2], i ∈ D \ F , ∅ 6= V ⊆ {(i, j), (j, j)}, (i, j) ∈ C, and (j, i) /∈ C, then
(J2D,F,V,C)CS -satisfiability is PSPACE-complete; otherwise it is in Σ
p
2 (see
[3]).
We will further examine the following two cases. J1,J2 are defined
in the following way. n1 = n2 = 3; D1 = D2 = {1, 2}; F1 = F2 = ∅;
V1 = ∅, V2 = {(3, 3)}; C1 = C2 = {(3, 1), (3, 2)}; finally, for i ∈ [2],
Ji = (J
ni
Di,Fi,Vi,Ci
)CSi , where CSi is some axiomatically appropriate and
schematic constant specification.
By an adjustment of the reductions in [2], as it was done in [3], it is not
hard to prove that J1 is PSPACE-hard and J2 is EXP-hard.
6 Notice that
6 J1 would correspond to what is defined in [3] as D2⊕⊆K and J2 to D2⊕⊆D4. Then
we can pick a justification variable x and we can either use the same reductions
and substitute ✷i by x:i, or we can just translate each diamond-free fragment to the
corresponding justification logic in the same way. It is not hard to see then that the
original modal formula behaves exactly the same way as the result of its translation
with respect to satisfiability - just consider F-models where always Ai(t, φ) =W .
the way we prove PSPACE-hardness for J1 is different in character from
the way we prove the same result for the two-agent logics in [3]. For J1
we use the way the tableau prefixes for it branch, while for (JD4×C JD)CS
the prefixes do not branch, but they increase to exponential size.
In fact, we can see that J1 is PSPACE-complete, while J2 is EXP-
complete. The respective tableau rules as they turn out for each logic are
- notice that neither logic has any ≤C-maximal V-classes:
The rules for J1 are:
σ T t:iψ
σ T ∗i (t, ψ)
σ T ✷iψ
TrB σ T t:1ψ
σ.{1} F ⊥
TrD
σ T t:2ψ
σ.{2} F ⊥
TrD
σ T t:3ψ
σ.{1} F ⊥
σ.{2} F ⊥
TrD σ F t:iψ
σ F ∗i (t, ψ)
Fa
σ T ✷iψ
σ.{i} T ψ
SB
if σ.{i} has already
appeared;σ T ✷3ψ
σ T ✷1ψ
σ T ✷2ψ
C
Notice that the maximum length of a world prefix is at most |φ|, since
the depth (nesting of terms) of the formulas decrease whenever we move
from σ to σ.{i}. Also notice that when we run the ∗-calculus, there is no
use for rule ∗V-Dis, so we can simply run the calculus on one world-prefix
at the time, without needing the whole frame. Therefore, we can turn
the tableau into an alternating polynomial time procedure, which uses a
nondeterministic choice when the tableau would make a nondeterministic
choice (when we apply the propositional rules) and uses a universal choice
to choose whether to increase prefix σ to σ.{1} or to σ.{2}. This means
that J1-satisfiability is PSPACE-complete.
The rules for J2 are the same with the addition of:
σ T ✷3ψ
σ T ✷3✷3ψ
V
σ.{i} F ⊥
σ.{i}.{1} F ⊥
σ.{i}.{2} F ⊥
S
For the tableau procedure of J2 we have no such bound on the size
of the largest world-prefix, so we cannot have an alternating polynomial
time procedure. As before, though, the ∗-calculus does not use rule ∗V-
Dis, so again we can run the calculus on one world-prefix at the time.
Furthermore, for every prefix w, |{w a ∈ b}| is polynomially bounded
(observe that we do not need more than two boxes in front of any formula),
so in turn we have an alternating polynomial space procedure. Therefore,
J2-satisfiability is EXP-complete.
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